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“The historical record makes clear that science depends
on technology in that it depends on the instruments and
tools that are needed for science to advance”.
Joel Mokyr (2013)
1 Capital as an input of knowledge when this is
a public good
It seems clear from Joel Mokyr that capital is as important in the production of
ideas as in the production of final goods. Otherwise, what would applied econo-
mists and econometricians have become without computers? In fact, without
better and better microscopes the medicine would not be what it has become.
Besides, would physics be the same without the particle accelerator? Of course,
capital producing ideas embodies particular knowledge and ideas, but it is not so
diﬀerent than capital producing goods, which also embodies particular knowl-
edge and ideas. In the following, we introduce capital in the production of
knowledge and discuss the associated problems arising from the public good
nature of knowledge.
Consider an economy with two technologies: one for final goods  and one
for knowledge  Final goods are private goods while knowledge is a public
good. This has a very important implication: final goods can be written in per
capita terms, but knowledge cannot, since all of us benefit from it in the same
way. And this fact could originate the emergence of some type of scale eﬀects:
the size of population matters in the determination of knowledge and, in turn,
per capita income.
First, let us consider the final goods sector. Total population  works either
producing goods  or producing knowledge . Since both labor inputs are a
fraction of total labor, define  =  and  = (1− ) where  is the frac-
tion of labor employed in the knowledge sector. The technology of a final goods
firm that chooses the amount of capital  and labor  can be summarized as
 = ( )1−
where  ∈ (0 1)  so that there are constant returns to scale at the firm level. By
defining the variables per eﬃciency units of labor, e =  and e = ,
this technology can be rewritten as
e = (1− ) e1−
Hence, a balanced growth path (BGP) exists if e is constant, that is, if  grows
at the same rate than  i.e. ˙ = ˙+ ˙. This means that per capita
income grows at the same rate than knowledge.
Let us now consider the knowledge sector. From Romer (1990) and Jones
(1995, 1999), it is commonly thought that when knowledge is a public good then
endogenous growth suﬀers from some type of scale eﬀects.1 But, it is really true
1Jones (1999) cites a huge amount of articles with this characteristic.
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that a nonrival and nonexcludable knowledge implies growth with scale eﬀects?
Next, we will argue that this implication is exclusively the result of the chosen
technologies for the production of knowledge. In particular, we will show that
the linearity in the researchers input for firms is the key for the emergence of
scale eﬀects. And that the introduction of capital as an input in the production
of knowledge can get the economy out of the scale eﬀects. Thus, we will have a
little relation between growth of per capita income and the size of the economy,
as suggested by Backus, Kehoe and Kehoe (1992).
The increase in knowledge ˙ arises from the production of new designs in
the R&D sector, since although the firm that discovers a new design is the only
that can produce it, the new design is publicly observable. In Romer (1990),
the technology of a R&D firm that produces ˙ and chooses the amount of labor
 is
˙ = 
where  is the success probability that any researcher has of inventing a new
design in any period. Note that the technology is linear in the researchers input
for firms, so that there are constant returns to scale at the firm level. Also
note that the new knowledge ˙ discovered by one particular firm constitutes
a common knowledge for the rest of the firms. By rewriting this equation, we
have
˙
 = 
so that constant population is needed for a BGP to exist. Note that the higher
the number of researchers, the higher the growth rate. Moreover, for the same
fraction of labor employed in the R&D sector, the economy with the highest
population has the highest growth rate. Thus, the economy suﬀers from scale
eﬀects.
In Jones (1995), the technology of a R&D firm is
˙ = −1 
where  represents external returns and can have any sign,  represents an
externality due to duplication in R&D such that in equilibrium  = , and
0   ≤ 1 Note that the technology is also linear in the researchers input for
firms, so that there are constant returns to scale at the firm level. By rewriting
this equation, in equilibrium we have
˙
 =

1− 
so that −1 has to be constant for a BGP to exist. If population grows at
the rate  this is true whenever
˙
 =

1− 
so that when population is constant we have no growth at all. Further, growth
is independent of the R&D success probability and the number of researchers.
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Moreover, the economy with the highest population growth rate has the highest
growth rate. Thus, the economy also suﬀers from scale eﬀects.
The two previous R&D linear technologies could explain R&D during the
past centuries or thousands of years. But at least from the 17th century (see
Mokyr, 2013, for past and present examples) almost all R&D is not only done
with researchers, but also with physical capital as laboratories or microscopes.
Thus, the linearity in the researchers input for firms is an interesting case of
study, but it does not seem to be the present case. Consider now the following
technology of a R&D firm that chooses the amount of labor  and capital :
˙ =  () 1− 
where  ∈ (0 1). Note that there are constant returns to scale at the firm
level. Redefining the capital used in the final goods production by   defining
 =  and  = (1− ) where  is total capital and  is the fraction
of capital employed in the R&D sector, this technology can be rewritten as
˙
 = 
1−e1−
so that constant population is needed for a BGP to exist. Therefore, the intro-
duction of capital in the R&D technology does not necessaryly get the economy
out of the scale eﬀects. For this to happen, we need to introduce some type of
externality. Thus, consider the following technology of a R&D firm:
˙ =  () 1− ()−1 
where   0. The externality  can be interpreted as a diﬀusion externality
such that the higher  the lower the diﬀusion of the innovation among popula-
tion (access of customers to the innovation, access of scientifics to other scientific
results, etc.).2 Note that the linear case where  = 1 does not coincide with
Romer’s and Jones’ R&D technologies because of diﬀerent externalities.3 We
can now rewrite the two technologies governing the economy as
e = (1− ) (1− )1− e1− (1)
and
˙
 = 
−11−e1−  (2)
so that now the unique requirement for a BGP to exist is e been constant.
Three facts have to be stressed. First, the exact externality in the R&D
technology is crucial for the results, which is alike in spirit to the one required
2Since knowledge is a public good, the externality can also represent a coordination cost
such that the higher  the higher the cost of coordinating people (see Becker and Murphy,
1992). An example is the Human Genome Project. Note that since  =  then ()−1
does not seem from an economic point of view a suitable coordination cost because then the
higher the number of researchers the lower the growth rate.
3 In this case we have ˙ = −1 a kind of thechnology dismissed by Jones (1995). This
is the reason for which we assume  ∈ (0 1).
5
in Romer (1986). Thus, any other kind of externality should be counterbalanced
in a suitable way in order to have a BGP. Second, population growth can aﬀect
economic growth, but it is not neccessary for growth to arise. And third, growth
depends on the R&D success probability and the number of researchers, what
seems natural to think about. We analyze these facts in the next section through
the social planner problem. After, we show how important are both capital and
population in the production of ideas and, hence, growth through a calibration
of the market economy. Finally, we find the optimal subsidy that makes the
market growth rate to coincide with the social planner one in order to realize
the existing economic ineﬃciency.
2 Social planner: population and growth
Consider an isoelastic utility function. Rewritting equations (1) and (2) in per
capita variables, the social planner problem is4
 ∞R
0
−(−)
µ1− − 1
1− 
¶
 (3)
 ˙ =  − −  = (1− ) (1− )1−1− − −  (4)
˙ = −11−1−  (5)
where  is the discount time factor,   0 and   and  are production,
consumption and capital per capita, respectively. The first order conditions
with respect to     and  can be written, respectively, as
− −  = 0 (6)
− (1− )−1  + −1˙ = 0 (7)
− (1− )  (1− )−1  + (1− )−1˙ = 0 (8)
(1− ) −1 −  + (1− ) −1˙ = −˙ + (− ) (9)
−1˙ + −1 = −˙ + (− )  (10)
where  and  are the multipliers associated to equations (4) and (5), respec-
tively.
In a BGP,  and  are constant and all the per capita variables and knowledge
grow at the same rate  From equations (7) and (8) we have that the relationship
between capital and labor used between sectors satisfies
1− 
 =
1− 

1− 


1−  (11)
4We maintain the same notation of the previous section.
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Diﬀerentiating equations (6) and (7) with respect to time, and noting that in a
BGP
··˙ = ˙ =  we have
− = ˙ =
˙
  (12)
Substituting for  in equation (10) from equation (8), and using equations (11)
and (12) we obtain
 =  + (− )  (13)
Note that  ()  0 and using equation (11) we have  ()  0
too. Substituting for  in equation (9) from equation (7), using equations (11)
and (12), substituting for −1 from equation (1) and after for −1 from
equation (5), and finally using equations (11) and (13) yields
( + ) ( + − ) 1− = (1− )
µ

¶ 
1− µ1− 


1− 
¶
 (14)
In view of this equation, it is clear that there is only one BGP.
Proposition 1 If  = 0 then the economy grows in the social planner BGP at
the rate
 =
∙
(1− )
³ 

´ 
1− ³1−


1−
´¸ 1−1−+ − 
  (15)
Moreover, the social planner growth rate is increasing in the population growth
rate, i.e.   0
The eﬀect of population growth on income growth diﬀers from the Ramsey-
Cass-Koopmans model, where population growth has no eﬀect on the steady
state. In principle, the higher the population growth, the higher the amount
of final goods that have to be dedicated for capital maintenance and, then, the
lower the labor dedicated to research. In the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model,
the planner’s weight on future increases with population in such a way that
oﬀsets capital maintenance. In our economy, this increase in the preference over
the future makes the social planner to directly increase the resources devoted
to R&D.
3 Decentralized economy: the importance of cap-
ital and population on growth
Next, we present the decentralized economy and make a calibration exercise
to show how important are both capital and population in the production of
knowledge. Since in the next sextion we analyze optimal subsidies, we allow for
them. There are three sectors in this economy. A competitive research sector
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uses labor and intermediate goods to produce new designs. A monopolistically
competitive intermediate goods sector uses these designs and foregone output to
produce inputs for the research sector and a final goods sector. Apart from the
intermediate goods, the competitive final goods sector uses labor to produce
final output, which can be either consumed or saved. Thus, there are two
basic inputs, capital and labor, which productivity is aﬀected by the state of
technology. Capital is measured in units of consumption goods. There is a
government that subsidizes intermediate goods production through a lump-sum
tax. Since there is a monopolistically sector, the decentralized equilibrium is
not eﬃcient.
Final goods firms: Final output  is produced through intermediate goods
and labor. The firm’s problem is
 
Ã
R
0
 1−
!
−   −
R
0
 
where the production function is à la Dixit-Stiglitz,  is the quantity of the
intermediate good  used to produce final goods,  measures the number of
available designs of intermediate goods in the economy,  is the wage paid in
this sector per unit of labor, and  is the price of the intermediate good  The
optimal conditions are
 = −1
Ã
R
0
 1−
!
=

  (16)
 = (1− )  − (17)
R&D firms: The technology of a R&D firm that produces the amount of
new designs ˙ is
˙ = 
Ã
R
0
1−
!
()−1  (18)
where  is the quantity of the intermediate good  used to produce new designs.
The firm’s problem is
 
ÃR
0
1−
!
()−1 −  −
R
0

where  is the price of a design, and  is the wage paid in this sector per
unit of labor. The optimal conditions are
 = −1
ÃR
0
1−
!
()−1 = ˙  (19)
 = (1− ) − ()−1  (20)
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Intermediate goods firms: A producer of an intermediate good pur-
chases a design created in the R&D sector, which confers monopoly power over
that particular good. As in Romer (1990), a putty-putty technology is con-
sidered, where the producer needs 1 unit of final good to produce 1 unit of
intermediate good. The problem faced by each firm  is to maximize profits
 = ( + ) ¡ + ¢− ¡ + ¢, subject to its inverse demand functions,
equations (17) and (20), where  is the interest rate, and  is a subsidy on the
production of intermediate goods given by the government. Moreover, since
discrimination is not allowed, the price of the intermediate good has to be the
same for all the buyers, so that
(1− )  − = (1− ) − ()−1  (21)
Using the constraints, the firm ’s problem becomes
  = ( +  − )
⎛
⎜⎝(1− )
1
 1
+
h
(1− )  ()−1
i 1 
 1
⎞
⎟⎠ 
Using equations (17) and (20), the optimal condition can be written as
 = ( − )
∙  + 
(1− ) +  (1− )
¸
 (22)
from where profits are
 = ¡ + ¢ µ +  + 
¶
 (23)
Households: A dynasty maximizes (3) subject to
˙ = [ + (1− ) ] + ( − ) − − 
where  is a lump-sum tax, and  is per capita assets. The Euler condition is
˙
 =
( − )
  (24)
Government: The government subsidizes intermediate production and taxes
households, such that
 = 
"
R
0
¡ +  ¢ 
#
 (25)
Market clearing conditions: Equilibrium in the labor market implies that
wages must be the same regardless of the firm. Thus, equations (16) and (19)
imply
−1
ÃR
0
 1−
!
=

 =
˙
 = 
−1

ÃR
0
1−
!
()−1  (26)
9
Since it takes 1 unit of final good to produce 1 unit of intermediate good,
capital is related to the number of intermediate goods. Therefore, total usage
of capital in each sector is
 =
R
0
  and  =
R
0
 (27)
Assets in this economy are capital and patents. Therefore,
 =  +  
which implies that
˙ = ˙ + ˙ +
˙
 −

 
The price of a new design reflects the incentives of the producers of inter-
mediate goods to acquire it. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991), we can
express that, at every moment in time, the instantaneous excess of revenue over
the marginal cost must be just suﬃcient to cover the interest cost on the initial
investment in a design. Or, in other words, the price of a design is equal to the
present value of the net revenue that a monopolist can extract. In our case,
that means  + ˙ =  which combined with equation (23) implies
 =
µ 

¶¡ + ¢µ +  + 
¶
+
˙
  (28)
Symmetric equilibrium and BGP: In a symmetric equilibrium all the
intermediate goods firms produce the same quantity through the same amount
of inputs, so that  =  ∀
R
0
  =  and
R
0
 1− =  1− and
 =  ∀
R
0
 =  and
R
0
1− = 1−  In a BGP the fractions of
labor and capital used in each sector are constant, so that  and  are constant.
Therefore, equations in (27) can be rewritten as
 = (1− ) and  =

  (29)
Combining equations (18), (21) and the final goods production function gives
(1− )
 =
(1− ) ˙
  (30)
which, using equations (26) and (29), becomes
1− 
 =
1− 

1− 


1−  (31)
Note that this equation coincides with that of the social planner, equation (11).
This does not mean that, in order to achieve the social planner growth rate in
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the next section, the market values of  and  have to coincide with those of
the social planner, since they have to correct the market power.
From the final goods production function and equation (29), in a BGP we
have ˙  = ˙+  Using this fact, diﬀerentiating equation (26) and noting
that
··˙ = ˙ yields ˙ =  Using this equation and equation (29),
equation (28) becomes
( − ) =
µ 

¶µ

¶ ∙(1− ) + 
(1− ) + 
¸

Using equations (22), (29) and (26) yields

 =
∙ (1− ) + 
 (1− ) (1− ) +  (1− )
¸"

˙

(1− )
 ( − )
#

And combining these two last equations gives
( − ) =
∙ (1− ) + 
 (1− ) (1− ) +  (1− )
¸"



˙

(1− )
 ( − )
#
 (32)
Substituting in equation (22) one  from equation (17) and the other  from
equation (20), summing up for , using the final goods production function and
equations (18) and (29) and after (30) gives
( − ) [(1− ) + ] = (1− )
∙
 (1− ) +  (1− ) 
1− 
¸
 (33)
Equations (18) and (29) yields
 =
µ

¶
1−
µ 

¶1−
 (34)
Combining the final goods production function with equation (29) gives

 = (1− )
 (1− )1−
µ

¶
 (35)
Combining equations (24), (32) and (33) yields
( + − ) =
∙(1− ) + 
(1− ) + 
¸ ∙
(1− )

(1− )


(1− )
¸
 (36)
And, finally, combining equations (24), (31), (33), (34) and (35) gives
( + ) = (1− )
∙ (1− ) (1− ) +  (1− )
(1− ) + 
¸ ∙
1− 


1− 
¸µ



¶ 
1−
+
(37)
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Equations (31), (36) and (37) implicitly gives the growth rate of the economy.
Calibration: We illustrate the importance of capital and population on
growth through a numerical exercise which strategy is the following: first, we
calibrate certain parameters of the decentralized BGP taking into account a
benchmark economy without subsidies. This allows us to show the importance
of capital in the production of knowledge. Second, we change population growth
to show how it aﬀects income growth. And, third, we make a robustness analysis.
We fix the value of the parameters as follows.  = 2 so that the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is 05 The population growth rate  is 1% The interest
rate  equals 52% and  = 0012 so that the growth rate is 2% In order
to find the values of  and  we assume that the labor income share in the
national income is 65% while the assets income share is 35% Thus, and following
Echevarria (1997), we have that
 +   = 065
which can be rewritten as

˙
˙
 +
 


 = 065
From Jones andWilliams (2000) we have that R&D spending to GDP ˙ =
31% so that  = 969% (note that intermediate goods are included in
both productions).5 Thus, and substituting equations (16) and (19), the previ-
ous equation becomes
0031 + 0969 = 065 (38)
Now, since the assets income share in the national income is 35% we have
 + = 035
which can be rewritten as



 +

 = 035 (39)
In order to recover the share of profits in the national income, McGrattan and
Prescott (2005a), in studying intangible capital, obtain that dividends are the
115%, i.e.  = 0115. But, also from McGrattan and Prescott (2005b),
we can conclude that the value of equities is around the 100% of GDP, i.e.
 =  . From the non-arbitrage condition in the assets market we have
that  =  ( − )  Thus, from these two equations we have  =
− = 0042 Since we have two diﬀerent values, we take the mean of these two
values, 00785 noting that, since dividends and equities include the payment or
value of both physical and intangible capital, this value should be a maximum
value. Thus, equation (39) becomes

 0969 + 00785 = 035
5 See footnote 15 of their paper, where they think that this number is a lower bound.
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Then, substituting  into equation (33) with  = 0 gives
028 [(1− ) + ] = (1− )
∙
 (1− ) +  (1− ) 
1− 
¸
 (40)
Finally, from equations (31), (36), (38) and (40) we recover  = 067  = 0042,
 = 1137% and  = 028% Equation (37) gives the discovering probability net
of coordination costs −1 = 0019 The summary of the calibration analysis is
in the two middle columns of Table 1. There are three important results to be
noted from this calibration exercise. First, the R&D sector is much more capital
intensive than the final goods sector, which remarks the actual big importance of
capital in the production of ideas.6 Second, the 028% of labor and the 1137%
of capital would be employed in the R&D sector.7 And third, we have  = 0069
so that the mark-up  for the intermediate goods firms is  = (− )  =
2495%8
Table 1. Calibration
R&D spending to GDP 31% Dividends to GDP 785%
Dividends 42% 785% 115% − − −
R&D spending − − − 15% 31% 62%
γ 0002 0042 0125 0066 0042 0006
α 067 067 067 066 067 069
u 305% 1137% 1628% 1333% 1137% 5%
s 0003% 028% 137% 056% 028% 0014%
m 605% 2495% 3907% 3005% 2495% 1047%
Table 2 shows the eﬀect of population growth on income growth. We have
to solve equations (31), (36) and (37), since the interest rate is now endogenous.
Note that since the discount rate is (−)  0, we have an upper bound for 
A higher growth rate is accompanied by a lower mark-up at the same time that
the labor and capital proportions employed in the R&D sector increase in order
to rise the growth rate. Nevertheless, although the magnitude of the growth
changes seems small, we can conclude that the eﬀect of population growth on
the growth rate comes basically from an increase in the capital devoted to R&D.
As a robustness analysis, we have repeated the same exercise first, when the
R&D spending is the 31% of the GDP and the dividends are the 42% and
115% of the GDP (following McGrattan and Prescott, 2005a and 2005b), and
second, when the dividends are the 785% of the GDP and the R&D spending is
the 15% and 62% of the GDP (half and double of that of Jones and Williams,
2000). The results of the calibration are in Table 1. As we can observe, when
6This is in contrast with the human capital literature, where it is commonly assumed that
the final goods sector is more capital intensive than the human capital sector.
7Recall that in our economy there are neither knowledge spillovers nor duplication exter-
nalities, as in Jones and Williams (2000).
8This implies a gross mark-up (the ratio of price to marginal cost) of 1327, which belongs
to the empirical estimates of 0052 to 14.
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dividends increase the R&D sector becomes more labor intensive and, then, the
labor and capital devoted to this sector dramatically rise. Contrarily, when
R&D spending increases, the R&D sector becomes less labor intensive and,
then, the labor and capital devoted to this sector decrease. In both cases, labor
intensiveness remains equal in the final goods sector. Thus, we can conclude
that the more labor intensive is the R&D sector, the higher the labor employed
in this sector, the higher the dividends to GDP, and the lower the R&D spending
to GDP.
Table 2. Changes in population growth
n = 0 n = 0002 n = 0005 n = 001 n = 0011
g 181% 185% 19% 2% 202%
u 981% 101% 1054% 1137% 1154%
s 0236% 0244% 0257% 0279% 0284%
r 475% 482% 494% 52% 517%
m 2734% 2686% 2614% 2495% 2471%
4 Optimal subsidies to intermediate goods pro-
duction
Next, we find the optimal subsidy to intermediate goods production that makes
the market growth rate to coincide with the social planner one. This allows us
to realize the economic ineﬃciency due to the monopolistically sector. Note that
this is only a BGP analysis and, therefore, this is not an optimal fiscal policy
problem. Thus, we should calculate  introducing into equations (31), (36)
and (37) the growth rate given by equation (14). Since we have calibrated the
decentralized economy without subsidies in the previous section, the strategy
now is the following: first, we use the calibrated parameters to calculate the
social planner BGP in the benchmark economy of 31% of R&D spending to
GDP and 785% of dividends to GDP. Second, we use the social planner growth
rate to recover the optimal subsidy. Third, we change the population growth
rate to show how it aﬀects the optimal growth rate and the optimal subsidy.
And fourth, we make a robustness analysis.
Applying the parameters of the benchmark economy to the social planner
BGP, we obtain a growth rate of 6% Moreover, the 214% of labor and the
4932% of capital would be employed by the social planner in the R&D sector in
order to have an almost three times larger growth rate. These seven times labor
and four times capital with respect to the market economy is due to the fact
that the social planner assigns the ressources in a marginal (competitive) way
solucionating the surplus appropiability (monopolistic competition) problem.
Substituting the social planner growth rate in the decentralized BGP, we
obtain  = 1173%  = 030%  = 0107  = 1318% and  = 0033 so that the
mark-up for intermediate goods firms is now  = (+  − )  (+ ) = 59%
Thus, although one may think that the subsidy is 322 times the intermediate
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goods price, the eﬀect of the subsidy is to lower the mark-up in order to increase
production. The rationale is that the subsidy moves the marginal income out
at the same time that the marginal cost increases, what makes the mark-up to
decrease.9
From Proposition 2 we know the positive eﬀect of population growth on the
social planner growth rate. Table 3 shows the eﬀect of population growth on the
growth rate and the optimal subsidy. A higher growth rate is accompanied by a
lower mark-up but the subsidy to price remains almost invariant, although the
labor and capital proportions employed in the R&D sector slightly increase in
order to rise the growth rate. Nevertheless, since the magnitude of the changes
seems small, we can conclude that the eﬀect of population growth on the growth
rate is not so important.
Table 3. Eﬃcient growth and optimal subsidy
n = 0 n = 0002 n = 0005 z=0n = 001 n = 001 n = 0011
g 578% 582% 589% 2% 6% 601%
u 1115% 1126% 1144% 1137% 1173% 1179%
s 028% 028% 029% 028% 030% 030%
zp 317 318 319 0 322 323
r 1276% 1285% 1297% 52% 1318% 1323%
m 618% 612% 604% 2495% 59% 587%
We do the same robustness analysis of the previous section. In Table 4 we
show the eﬃcient growth rates and the optimal subsidies associated to the ca-
Table 4. Eﬃcient growth in diﬀerent scenarios
R&D spending to GDP 31% Dividends to GDP 785%
Dividends 42% 785% 115% − − −
R&D spending − − − 15% 31% 62%
 0002 0042 0125 0066 0042 0006
g 958% 6% 555% 560% 6% 830%
u 361% 1173% 1664% 1357% 1173% 484%
s 00055% 030% 140% 057% 030% 0012%
zp 821 322 246 27 322 765
r 2036% 1318% 1230% 124% 1318% 1780%
m 080% 59% 1118% 8% 59% 114%
libration of Table 1. A lower  implies a higher ineﬃciency and, then, a higher
social planner growth rate and a higher subsidy. The rationale is that a lower
 means that the public good has a lower weight in the production of R&D,
9Note that an alternative interpretation could be that, due to the production linearity, the
subsidy reduces the marginal cost of the intermediate goods firms, so that the marginal cost
becomes ( − ) = 00246 and the mark-up is (−  + )  = 023 But this interpretation
would imply a lower marginal cost and the same marginal income, which would imply a higher
mark-up.
15
what implies that the market undervalues even more the R&D. Thus, a higher
subsidy on intermediate goods is needed.
5 Conclusions
We have introduced capital as an input in the production of knowledge and
discussed the associated problems arising from the public good nature of knowl-
edge. We have shown that although population growth can aﬀect economic
growth, it is not necessary for growth to arise. We have derived both the social
planner and the decentralized economy growth rates and showed the optimal
subsidy that decentralizes it. We have shown numerically that the eﬀects of
population growth on the market growth rate, the optimal growth rate and the
optimal subsidy are small. Besides, we have found that physical capital is more
important for the production of knowledge than for the production of goods.
Clearly, future analysis should focus on the technology for the production
of knowledge or R&D technology and its microfoundations. A good example is
García-Rodríguez and Sánchez-Losada (2014).
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